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Recent discoveries may significantly reshape our understanding of the 9/11 attacks, which occurred over two decades ago.
This information, which was submitted to the FBI shortly after the attacks, has only recently come to light; it appears that it was not shared with important field agents or intelligence officials. The delay raises questions about why such vital evidence is surfacing only now.
The newly unveiled evidence is part of an ongoing lawsuit filed against the Saudi government by families of the nearly 3,000 victims of the attacks. This includes a disturbing video showing a Saudi national recording the U.S. Capitol.
In the video, a voice speaking Arabic mentions, “I am transmitting these scenes to you from the heart of the American capital, Washington.”
Filmed during the summer of 1999, the video was unsealed in federal court last year as part of the lawsuit alleging that Saudi Arabia provided significant support to the hijackers.
Central to this case is Omar al-Bayoumi, the individual who recorded the video. He can be seen having a bystander film him in front of the Capitol.
The FBI states that Bayoumi lived in the United States on a student visa and received payments from a Saudi aviation company in California, despite not attending classes or reporting to work. Investigators have determined that Bayoumi was likely acting as an operative for the Saudi intelligence service and had connections to two of the hijackers.
The recording spanned several days, capturing the Capitol’s entrances, security checkpoints, and nearby landmarks.
In the footage, Bayoumi points out the Washington Monument, saying, “I will get over there,” and mentions the proximity of the airport.
Richard Lambert, a retired FBI supervisor who led the early 9/11 investigation in San Diego, noted how Bayoumi created a detailed visual record of the Capitol from various angles.
Lambert describes the Washington Monument as a crucial landmark for anyone incoming to D.C. He suggests that knowing this geography could aid in targeting.
Federal officials suspect that the hijackers on Flight 93 intended to strike the U.S. Capitol, and the video features Bayoumi alluding to a “plan.”
When questioned about this plan, Lambert suggested it related to al-Qaeda’s operatives who commissioned him to conduct reconnaissance.
Bayoumi’s video, filmed in late June and early July of 1999, coincided with key al-Qaeda decisions to target the Capitol, made just 90 days prior to the attacks. This decision was finalized by Osama bin Laden, approving the “planes operation” orchestrated by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
Following a raid on Bayoumi’s U.K. residence ten days after 9/11, authorities seized this video along with approximately 80 other tapes and significant documents now utilized in the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. An internal FBI report from October 11, 2001, indicates that all recovered materials were sent to FBI-New York, yet the Capitol video was never forwarded to the San Diego office.
Danny Gonzalez, a retired FBI special agent and primary investigator on the 9/11 case in San Diego, expressed his frustration upon discovering the video’s existence, stating that neither he nor any of his colleagues in San Diego or New York were ever informed about it.
Gonzalez emphasized that had they received the Capitol video, it could have been instrumental in building a case against Bayoumi.
He insisted this evidence warranted close scrutiny from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, as it was part of a terrorism investigation linked to mass murder.
Gina Bennett, a former senior counterterrorism analyst at the CIA, echoed these sentiments, indicating that such critical evidence should have been communicated directly to the highest levels of government.
In defense of the Saudi government, representatives labeled the video as simply a tourist record, a perspective Bennett challenges. She noted the focus on strategic details within the footage, such as security arrangements.
Bennett, who initially warned against the potential threats posed by global jihadist movements led by bin Laden, was also unaware of the video’s existence until approached about it for evaluation.
She expressed surprise that senior intelligence figures, including CIA Director George Tenet and Michael Morell, the president’s daily intelligence briefer, were also oblivious to it.
The skepticism around its months-long dormancy raises serious concerns about evidence management and oversight within intelligence agencies.
Additional evidence has emerged, including a sketch of an airplane and mathematical formulas discovered in Bayoumi’s apartment and submitted to the FBI in 2001. This material went unnoticed for over a decade until Gonzalez was unexpectedly contacted by an FBI technician in 2012 about locating evidence associated with Bayoumi.
After acquiring this information, the FBI had experts evaluate the sketch, revealing it could assist a pilot in calculating descent rates for target strikes.
The 9/11 Commission, which produced what was considered the authoritative account of the attacks in 2004, had no knowledge of this evidence during its investigation. This lack of information extended to multiple former senior intelligence officials as well.
Bayoumi, who relocated to Saudi Arabia after the attacks without facing any charges, responded vaguely about his sketch during a deposition in the ongoing lawsuit, suggesting it may have been a high school mathematics problem.
No definitive connection has been established linking Bayoumi to sharing this equation with the hijackers. Still, records indicate that he facilitated the arrival of two hijackers nearly two years before the attacks, claiming a coincidental meeting that led him to aid them in settling in the U.S. He helped them find accommodation, co-signed leases, opened bank accounts, and even hosted a party that included one of the hijackers, all of which he recorded. Both Bayoumi and the Saudi government assert these actions were innocuous coincidences.
Gonzalez dismisses the notion that Bayoumi’s involvement was merely coincidental, citing a lack of evidence to support that he assisted anyone else besides the hijackers.
Saying it’s “awful” that Bayoumi remains in Saudi Arabia, Gonzalez contended that he should face justice within the U.S. judicial system.
The 9/11 Commission described Bayoumi as an “unlikely” candidate for covert involvement with extremists, but Bennett argues this perspective may have been based on incomplete information.
With the volume of evidence available—including the video, the sketch, and accounts of support for the hijackers—Bennett concluded that Bayoumi was vital in facilitating their mission, given their inexperience and lack of English proficiency.
She believes al-Qaeda would not have placed operatives in a large city without a supportive network to ensure their operational success.
Bennett highlighted the new evidence’s implications, prompting critical questions about the extent of any other existing networks and whether additional evidence remains undiscovered.
The Saudi government has filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit from 9/11 families, asserting that neither it nor Omar al-Bayoumi had any involvement in the attacks. A ruling on this motion is expected soon, while the FBI has refrained from commenting on the unfolding litigation.
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